Given that the aim of detention for treatment under the Act must usually be the rehabilitation of the patient and hence their return to liberty, which may entail an element of testing in the community or reintegration, it is sensible to have leave as part of a care plan. Whether leave is treatment is a different question, but one which is important to resolve because in assessing whether liability to detention remains appropriate and necessary (to use the example of a s3 treatment order and its substantive criteria), it has to be for the purposes of treatment. So what amounts to treatment is central to whether liability to detention should remain in place.
The starting point is the language of the statute, under which "medical treatment" is widely defined 10 as including (and so not being limited to) "nursing, and … care, habilitation and rehabilitation under medical supervision". The use of leave as a part of the testing of progress is easily categorised as rehabilitation. But what if leave becomes long-term, such that the patient may no longer have a bed assigned? Both sections 2 and 3, plus the provisions for the renewal of the section 3 order in section 20, have as a pre-requisite that the patient's condition is such that detention in a hospital is required: so the breadth of the definition of what amounts to treatment seems to be qualified by the context that the patient's condition must be such as to require it on in-patient basis. Extended leave to allow the patient to reside in the community is difficult to square with the need for in-patient treatment to justify the continuation of the section. But there are no specific limits on leave, which can be granted indefinitely 11 , and there is the wide definition of what is treatment.
How this tension has been resolved can be traced through a number of cases, the net effect of which is a judicial endorsement of the view that extended leave is part of a treatment programme and only a very limited amount of in-patient treatment is required, which need not involve any bed being provided at the 12 , in which it was noted that the law did not permit the patient to be detained in order to be released on leave with the status of "liable to detention" and hence subject to treatment even though the patient is in the community: some form of in-patient treatment remains necessary. The next case is R v Barking, Havering and Brentwood Community Healthcare NHS Trust ex p B 13 , where a section 3 patient's detention was renewed at a time when she was allowed to be at home between Thursday and Monday inclusive and to be away from the hospital during the days when she slept in the hospital. She was subject to ongoing monitoring to determine whether she was using illicit drugs. The renewal was challenged on the basis that there was insufficient in-patient treatment: the test for renewal 14 is that medical treatment in hospital "cannot be provided unless he continues to be detained". The Court of Appeal, in rejecting the challenge, held that the phrase "continues to be detained" should be construed to mean "continues to be liable to be detained" and that the treatment as a whole -including returning from leave and being monitored for drug use -was sufficient to meet the test. It was important, noted the Court, to assess whether or not the treatment plan as a whole required an element of in-patient treatment to ensure its success. If this were the case, then the test for liability to detention would be made out even if the patient spent a considerable part of the time on leave 15 . 16 the issue for the Administrative Court was whether it was proper to renew the detention of a patient who lived outside hospital and who returned only for occupational therapy one day a week and to attend the ward round on a different day for monitoring and review by the clinical team. The liability to detention was the only way in which DR would take her prescribed medication, without which there would be a rapid deterioration. The judge held that the renewal was valid, and went further than had the Court of Appeal in the Barking case. Wilson J commented that the latter case had involved in-patient treatment, and so it was natural that there would be reference to in-patient treatment: he felt that the requirement was only for there to be treatment at a hospital 17 . On the facts, the judge found that the requirements to attend hospital on two separate days meant that a significant component of treatment plan was provided in hospital and so it was permissible to renew the section and hence subject the patient to treatment without her consent. He also noted that leave of absence may be part of the treatment regime 18 . 19 , the facts before the Tribunal related to a patient on leave with a requirement that she attend ward rounds every four weeks. She had a history of not complying with medication for her diagnosed condition, schizophrenia, leading to a deterioration of her state and 12 [1986] 1 QB 1090 1 QB . 13 [1999 1 FLR 106. 14 Section 20(4) (a) and (c readmission to hospital. At the ward rounds, there was discussion of her progress, whether changes in medication were required, and what was described as motivational interviewing to assist in her move to out-patient treatment; she received anti-psychotic medication by injection in hospital because she did not wish to receive it at home and had sessions with the ward psychologist. The Tribunal upheld the section on the basis that her poor insight and history of non-compliance with medication and disengagement with services meant that she would probably refuse medication and deteriorate rapidly if taken off section, so the nature of the illness justified detention.
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Five weeks later, her care was transferred to a community psychiatrist and the section was lifted approximately 6 weeks after that. A challenge to the Tribunal decision failed on the basis that there was a significant element of treatment at hospital as part of a transition towards discharge, which was designed to break the historical cycle of relapse and readmission. Although Pitchford J rejected a submission that "the mere existence of the hospital and its capacity to be treated by the patient as a refuge and stability is part of the treatment of the patient at that hospital", he noted that the treating psychiatrist was planning a staged discharge designed to break the cycle of admission, serious relapse and readmission. So extended leave of absence is legally acceptable as part of the process of treatment, allowing patients to be treated at hospital even if they are not in-patients: at the outer limits, liability to detention is liability to be recalled from leave so long as there remains a process of moving the patient towards the community (which may be extended).
Once released from liability to detention under section 3 of the Act, a patient has a right to aftercare under s117 of the Act: this is phrased as a duty on the relevant social service and health authorities to provide aftercare 20 . Onto this is grafted the Care Programme Approach process, based in Department of Health guidance to health and social services, which is designed to ensure that there is easy access to care, and provides for a level of intensity in care planning which is suitable for the needs of the patient and so designed to ensure there is ongoing service provision but also monitoring and persuasion where there is limited co-operation 21 .
In addition, there is the power to make the patient subject to an order for aftercare under supervision, under ss25Aff of the 1983 Act, introduced by the Mental Health (Patients in the Community) Act 1995 as from 1 April 1996. This was designed for patients who do not exercise their right to aftercare services because they do not accept its need (or may be insufficiently organised to co-operate fully). The patient must be 16 or over and liable to detention under section 3 of the 1983 Act when the order is made 22 ; it must be determined (but only in the loose sense that the opinion must be formed by the treating psychiatrist) that the failure to accept aftercare services would lead to a "substantial risk of serious harm to the health or safety of the patient or the safety of other persons or of the patient being seriously exploited" and the use of the order is "likely to help to secure that he receives the aftercare services" 23 . A risk which is more than remote of the patient relapsing so that the degree of their illness necessitates in-patient treatment would meet the test 24 .
The patient on an aftercare under supervision order may be required to reside at a particular place (such as a hostel or similar setting), to attend for treatment, occupation, education or training (and be taken and conveyed there), and to grant access to medical and social care professionals 25 . The statute sets out a process for the making of an application, and its review 26 : these arrangements, which include a consultation process, are comparable to what is required by the CPA process 27 . A failure by the patient to co-operate means that there should be consideration of whether to assess him or her for a return to liability to detention through the making of a further order for detention 28 . Naturally, this may also apply if the patient co-operates fully but deteriorates.
So the 1983 Act provides for a regime of liability to detention whilst residing in the community on leave (from which recall is a simple matter of a written order of revocation if that is felt "necessary … in the interests of the patient's health or safety or for the protection of other persons" 29 ), and for ongoing monitoring on release from liability to detention. There is no power to require acceptance of treatment in a community setting: but a patient on s17 leave can be recalled, and in relation to a person receiving aftercare under supervision there is persuasion and the threat of a review which might lead to detention 30 .
(ii) The New Regime The criteria for the use of a CTO are that there be a mental disorder requiring treatment for the protection of the patient or others (and that appropriate treatment be available 36 ), but that "such treatment can be provided without his continuing to be detained in a hospital" though with the additional point that it is necessary that the power of recall to hospital be available 37 . In assessing whether the latter test is met, the "responsible clinician" 38 must consider the risk of deterioration in the absence of detention in hospital 39 .
The making of a CTO means that the patient is discharged from hospital but is made liable to recall 40 ; in addition, conditions can be imposed, provided they are "necessary or appropriate" to ensure that the patient receives treatment or to prevent risk to the patient or protect others 41 .
One of the conditions will invariably be that the patient accept treatment: but there is no way to enforce any condition, ie compulsion will not be available 42 So the requirement that the treatment be possible without detention -the substantive test -means that the criteria for a CTO are fairly strict: the RC must form a view that the patient will accept treatment in the community. In turn, this means that the CTO is as much dependent on the co-operation of the patient as is aftercare under supervision if the key component for successful maintenance in the community is medication.
(b) Putting a CTO in Place: there is no application process; instead an order for a CTO may be made by the RC. Before making such an order, there must be consultation with, and agreement by, an Approved Mental Health Professional 44 . The process may appear more streamlined than the requirements in relation to aftercare under supervision, but since this all takes place in the context of the CPA and the need for adequate community-based services to be in place, this is hardly a difference which is fundamental 45 . There may be an assumption that the RC will be the same, whereas aftercare under supervision may well have set a requirement for extensive consultation on the basis of an assumption that there would be a different Responsible Medical Officer in the community: the process is, naturally, much easier if there is in fact only one clinician involved. It should be noted that since the government wishes CTOs to be considered instead of leave lasting more than 7 days, and the process of ordering s17 leave is simpler still than the CTO process, the bureaucratic burden of operating the new regime may be greater overall if patients currently on s17 leave are moved to CTOs.
(c) Recall: although breach of a condition is a relevant factor in determining whether to recall 46 , it does not automatically lead to recall. The criteria for recall are that the patient "requires medical treatment in hospital for his mental disorder" and a failure to recall would present "a risk of harm to the health or safety of the patient or to other persons" 47 . This may be met even if there is no breach of condition 48 . It is also stated in section 17E(2) that "the responsible clinician may also recall a community patient to hospital if the patient fails to comply with a condition..." 49 .
The important point is that there is a power of recall, not a duty. Since its effect is that, at least if accompanied by a revocation of the CTO under s17F, the patient returns to the status of a patient under section 3 of the Act, the recall power can be used properly only if the patient meets the test under that section. Again, to quote the Minister of State in Committee 50 : This in turn ought to mean that the only difference between a CTO and the supervised discharge provisions in terms of returning the patient to hospital is that the latter requires a formal resectioning process before the patient is returned to detention, ie a formal assessment with medical and social work support in favour of detention: but this is consistent with the requirements of ethical good practice, which discourages unilateral decision-making, and should not pose a difficulty if the CPA process is working properly in relation to the patient 51 . Equally importantly, if the recall is to a mental health unit which is operating at full capacity, the need to find a bed for a recalled patient will be of as much significance as filling out the relevant form.
"I should also say… that if an individual did not stick to the conditions, it would not automatically mean that they would be recalled to hospital. It is up to the clinician to decide whether it is appropriatewhether it is because the person has become a risk to themselves or others -for them
So, the CTO does not represent a major change from the existing powers to make creative use of s17 leave (which will remain but be discouraged in relation to leave of more than 7 days) and the aftercare under supervision powers (which will disappear). It is a shuffling around of the deck of powers rather than the addition of new ones.
B. The Route Taken to the New Position and the Policy Position
If this is right and there is no real change, one question which arises is why did the government make it such a priority to introduce something which it could describe as a new form of order requiring treatment in the community? Assuming a rational explanation exists, one possibility is that there was simply a momentum towards reform involving the introduction of a CTO, and that in the process of compromise that was involved in the formulation of the policy, no-one took the opportunity to stand back and realise that there was in fact no significant reform. At the less charitable end of the same continuum, the explanation is that there was too great a political momentum towards asserting that there was major change even though the reality was one of semantics.
(i) The Momentum Towards a CTO Regime
It is certainly the case that the introduction of some form of CTO has featured throughout the extended reform process.
(a) The Expert Committee and the Initial Proposals
The Expert Committee 52 proposed a new structure to compulsory orders, requiring authorisation by a Tribunal for anything beyond short-term assessment and more restrictive grounds for the use of compulsion, particularly for those with capacity 53 . But it would be possible for the treatment order to be on an in-patient or community treatment basis, with conditions set out in the order (referring to the obligations of both the patient and the care team). Non-compliance by the patient together with deterioration in health would lead to detention. As to the location of treatment, the Committee indicated that force could only be used to administer medication in a hospital "until safe and adequately staffed non-hospital settings are available" 54 . The Committee did express the view that a community order would not be appropriate in the absence of "a history of failure to accept the proposed care and treatment" to demonstrate the necessity of an order 55 .
The Green Paper issued by the Government following the Expert Committee Report accepted the recommendation relating to the new Tribunal and the power to make CTOs 56 , as did a White Paper issued after consultation on the Green Paper 57 . The Government eventually produced a Draft Bill in 2002 58 , which was designed to replace the Mental Health Act 1983. Its structure for the use of compulsion in the civil context was that an examination would be carried out when requested 59 , which could lead to an assessment section being imposed, on an in-patient or out-patient basis 60 . The main function of the assessment process was the formulation of a care plan on the basis of which an application would be made to the Mental Health Tribunal for a treatment order 61 : this could be as a resident or nonresident patient.
(b) The 2004 Draft Bill
There was a similar structure proposed in the further Draft Bill of 2004 62 , which was subject to prelegislative scrutiny by a Committee of both Houses of Parliament 63 . The latter examined the issue of CTOs in some depth 64 , having set the context as the move towards treatment in the community. The Mental Health Act Commission gave evidence that of the 13,500 patients detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 at any one time, a relatively significant proportion were in the community under the leave of absence powers of s17 of the Act. The Commission also noted that the proposals in the Draft Bill for non-resident patients (who could be required to attend at specified places, reside, be available for assessment and not engage in specified conduct) was closely approximate to the use of detention and leave and so the effect was to consolidate and clarify the existing legal regime.
Other evidence to the Joint Committee made it clear that there were significantly different views as to the principle behind and efficacy of CTOs. Its conclusion 65 was that the framework suggested in the Draft Bill was too wide: "non-residential compulsion could be applied to a far wider population than is appropriate, and in circumstances which could be unacceptable". Amendments were therefore recommended to provide a more focussed power: CTOs would normally require previous hospitalisation (albeit only for assessment) and evidence of responsiveness to and co-operation with treatment; and there would be limitations, namely the only permissible conditions would be residence and treatment, force would be permissible only in hospital settings, and there would be time limits, with a maximum of three years on an order in any five. The Joint Committee also expressed concern that the CTO regime would be used to manage limited inpatient resources (by discharging people because of bed shortages), and so emphasised the importance of having a significant increase in resources, to be achieved by imposing a duty on health and local authorities to provide adequate care.
(c) Scotland
The Draft Bill of 2004 went no further. In the meantime, the Scottish Parliament had instituted a process of reform of its own legislation. An expert report led to a Bill and then an Act which passed in 2003. The Millan Committe 66 had a number of proposals for reform. One was that the criteria for long-term compulsion involve not only a mental disorder of a nature or degree making treatment appropriate and that it be necessary for the health or safety of the patient or the protection of others (which should be expressed as a significant risk of harm to the health, safety or welfare of the patient, or a significant risk of harm to others), but also that the patient suffer from impaired judgment to the extent that compulsory treatment was appropriate and that the treatment be likely to provide a therapeutic benefit (in alleviating or preventing a deterioration of the patient's condition or symptoms). It further suggested that if the criteria for compulsion were made out, the location of treatment should be either on an in-patient or community basis, depending on what was the least restrictive alternative (but with the proviso that there could be no forced medication in the community, and a Code of Practice should specify treatments that should only be given on an in-patient basis). The Committee also recommended that the decision as to this be made by a Mental Health Tribunal, which would have to sanction compulsion on the basis of a care plan.
The Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 67 largely adopted the recommendations of the Millan Committee. The structure it provides is for administratively imposed emergency and shortterm detention, but any longer term compulsion must be on the basis of a Compulsory Treatment Order made by the Mental Health Tribunal for Scotland 68 . It provides for community treatment. The criteria for compulsion are set out in s64(5):
"(a) that the patient has a mental disorder; "(b) that medical treatment which would be likely to-(i) prevent the mental disorder worsening; or (ii) alleviate any of the symptoms, or effects, of the disorder, is available for the patient;
"(c) that if the patient were not provided with such medical treatment there would be a significant risk-(i) to the health, safety or welfare of the patient; or (ii) to the safety of any other person; "(d) that because of the mental disorder the patient's ability to make decisions about the provision of such medical treatment is significantly impaired;
"(e) that the making of a compulsory treatment order in respect of the patient is necessary; and "(f) where the Tribunal does not consider it necessary for the patient to be detained in hospital, such other conditions as may be specified in regulations." The measures that may be specified in a Compulsory Treatment Order are set out in s66 of the Act: they include treatment, detention or attendance for treatment or to receive community care services, residence (and also having to seek permission to change address, or to inform the official coordinating the treatment plan of a change of address), and allowing visits by doctors or community care service providers. So the Tribunal has a clear option to determine that anyone who is in need of ongoing treatment can be made the subject of a non-resident order, which seems to have become known as the Community Based Compulsory Treatment Order 69 .
(ii) The Mental Health Act 2007: The Policy Objectives 
"Supervised community treatment is probably the key change in the Bill … It is important not just from a patient and public safety angle but because clinical practice itself has changed. At present, most patients treated under the Mental Health Act are detained in hospital. That reflects the fact that, in 1983, most acute mental health services were provided in hospital. However the world has moved on and we now have a wide range of community-based mental health services...."
These, he noted, were suitable for the needs of some patients, as was the practice in various other countries. The group to be targeted were patients who… "… stop taking their medication or treatment once they leave hospital, and so relapse and end up being readmitted. This detrimental cycle is often referred to as the revolving door. Patients on supervised community treatment will benefit from a structure designed to promote safe community living. This will reduce the risk of relapse and re-detention…" But there would be the power of recall in case of deterioration, which would be the only situation in which treatment could be forced. As for numbers 71 , he gave the government estimate as rising "to the order of 3,000 to 4,000 per year over a five-year period" 72 . The changes introduced by the Lords were roundly criticised as producing the risk "either that patients have to stay longer in hospital, or be discharged without proper supervision. The result again may be that they become a danger to themselves and others". She indicated that they had to be overturned.
And overturned they duly were in the Public Bill Committee 78 . Ms Winterton set out government policy in more detail 79 . She noted that the CTO regime was well-established in other jurisdictions and was "a measure to enable patients to receive treatment under formal supervision without always having to be in a hospital setting, which is not necessarily the best place for an individual to make a recovery … CTOs are seen as the modern workable way to manage mental disorder in a community setting 80 ". In relation to the target group, namely 'revolving door patients', the aim was to avoid having to wait until they deteriorated to the extent that they needed to be in hospital: the aftercare under supervision provisions were deficient because it was necessary to allow people to deteriorate to the level when they were sectionable before they could be taken back into hospital 81 .
This does not hold water as a matter of law. Detention under the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983 turns on the nature or degree of the disorder: so a person who suffers from a relapsing illness and who is relapsing or engaging in conduct which the clinical team can say will lead to relapse can be detained on the basis of the nature of the illness without any need for the degree of the illness to become acute. The additional requirement for detention under section 3 of the Act, namely that it be necessary for the health or safety of the patient or the protection of others, is also met by conduct (such as failure to take medication) which will lead to a deterioration in the degree of the illness. If there is a problem in practice because the law is not understood or used properly, that is a different matter, but presumably the first line of response to that should be training on the existing law.
Ms Winterton next prayed in aid the report of the inquiry into the homicide committed by John Barrett, noting that it had said:
"In our view, the only means of securing John Barrett's compliance with treatment as an out-patient would have been a community treatment order, which is not available under the Mental Health Act." 82
It is worth putting this comment in context. To explain, the inquiry 83 was into the killing by Mr Barrett of a cyclist in a London park; Mr Barrett suffered from schizophrenia. Prior to the homicide, he had been convicted of serious assaults and made the subject of a hospital order with a restriction order (ss37 and 41 Mental Health Act 1983); he had been granted a conditional discharge by a Mental Health Review Tribunal in October 2003, and his life was subject to conditions, including the standard one that he comply with medication. During the period of his conditional discharge, he had a short informal admission in May 2004 because of his concerns that he was hearing voices. The suggestion of a recurrence of symptoms led to a further informal admission on 1 September 2004 to a medium secure unit: his psychiatrist could not see him that day, and he was allowed to leave the hospital but told that he was expected back after an hour. He did not return, and stayed overnight with a friend; responding to auditory hallucinations, he committed the homicide on 2 September. The Inquiry team found various deficiencies which played a part in the homicide, including the failure to detain Mr Barrett formally on 1 September and the decision to give him permission to leave the ward.
The comment referred to by Ms Winterton as to the need for a CTO to secure the taking of treatment by Mr Barrett relates to the Inquiry team's review of Mr Barrett's care and treatment in the period to January 2002 84 , which was before the assaults which led to the imposition of the hospital and restriction orders. At the time of the homicide, he was a conditionally discharged restricted patient, and so he was subject to a regime involving conditions of the sort that will be available under the CTO regime. (Moreover, he could not be made the subject of a CTO as a restricted patient.) It was the failure of the team involved with the care and treatment of Mr Barrett to make use of their existing powers, not the absence of a CTO, which was the problem. Indeed, the Inquiry panel specifically stated 85 :
"6. The remedy for what went wrong in this case lies not in new laws or policy changes. Nor is there any reason to believe that an insufficiency of resources contributed in any way to the shortcomings we have found. The challenge, both organisational and individual, is to ensure that the care of potentially dangerous psychiatric patients is based on sound clinical practice and the systematic application of established principles of risk and organisational management. ..."
So, when the Minister emphasised the importance of the "recommendation" of the John Barrett inquiry, there was no recommendation 86 ; and Mr Barrett was subject to a regime which the CTO provisions will emulate for non-restricted patients.
Moving next to the potential for preventing self harm 87 , the Minister noted that the report of a national inquiry 88 indicated that there were "1,300 suicides a year … carried out by people who have been in touch with mental health services" and that "56 people in the last year had committed suicide following noncompliance with medication or loss of contact with services" and so that was the potential.
Again, it is worth reviewing the primary source. It involved a survey of 6367 suicides between January 2000 and December 2004 by people who were at the time or had been recently been in contact with mental health services: so the average number is some 1300 per year (and it represents some 27% of all suicides). Clinicians felt that 19% of suicides were preventable 89 : however, the percentages vary according to the status of the patient (and the inquiry commented that its calculations were necessarily somewhat crude). So, of the suicides by in-patients (including those released on leave), some 41% were felt to be preventable. There were also those who committed suicide between discharge and their first follow-up, of which 22% were felt to be preventable. Of the other "community suicides", some 12% were felt to be preventable. The report specifically addressed the issue of CTOs in the following terms: The inquiry investigated the factors behind non-compliance. A significant one was lack of insight (which was thought to be a factor in 48% of the cases). It also reviewed responses from professionals to the problems of non-compliance: they were the use of higher levels of service provision under the CPA system (in 46% of the cases) and face to face attempts to encourage use of medication (in 73% of cases and 83% of the patients in the group who suffered from schizophrenia). On the question of whether suicides by those who were not compliant with medication were preventable, the inquiry reported that 24% of those suicides were classed as preventable, but the tools to be used were better compliance and closer supervision: new legal powers were specified by respondents to the survey only in 4% of cases (34 out of the 813 instances). At the risk of stating the obvious a mental disorder of a nature or degree to cause suicide is one which can be used to detain.
Whether the figure the Minister should have used was 56 cases per year or the 34 cases over 5 years, either figure represents a number of tragedies. But the focus should have been on the success in reducing suicides in non-compliance cases without the availability of the CTO regime 91 to assess the factors involved in this and build upon them. Moreover, there remain more significant problems in relation to in-patient deaths (856 in the survey period). And the real danger period for those discharged into the community is the first three weeks 92 , which is not the crucial period to which the CTO regime is aimed: Ms Winterton was aiming at the patients who were not in the immediate post-discharge period.
What conclusion can be drawn as to the reason for the introduction of the CTO? The policy objectives mentioned by the government had two themes: one was the structure of modern practice and the other was the need to protect both patients and the public. But modern practice has developed under the 1983 Act without anything termed a CTO among the techniques designed to seek to prevent the revolving door cycle, the need to tackle which is hardly controversial. Moreover, the new regime offers no new legal powers to offer protection to patients or the public. When this is added to the use of figures and quotations by government ministers which are at best misleading and emphasise serious self-harm and danger to the public -matters which tend to grab headlines -it does suggest that this was a political imperative."
C. Do CTOs Work?
The further question posed is whether CTOs work in any event, and if so in what form? In "Community Treatment Orders: International Comparisons" 93 , Professor John Dawson formed a view that the research as to the efficacy of CTO regimes presented a relatively positive picture 94 . However, he noted that success was more likely when there were well-resourced and co-ordinated systems in operation, which include community visits from clinicians who are committed to the system; and that there were risks, including de-facto detention, overuse in relation to some groups where the efficacy of the CTO was less clear (particularly younger males with concurrent substance abuse problems), and issues about the overuse of CTOs to deal with pressure on beds and inadequate reviews of the ongoing use of CTOs on patients who have been on them for an extended period.
Dawson considered the legal regimes in place in New Zealand, Victoria and New South Wales in Australia, Canada (and in particular Ontario), Switzerland and the British jurisdictions, and also the structure of service provision. His aim was to assess the adequacy of the regime in New Zealand, where a CTO was introduced to the statute book in 1992, but in so doing he provides a detailed analysis of the formats available in the jurisdictions he covered. In particular, he was able to identify what he called "the major fault-lines" in CTO legislation, namely the role of capacity 95 and the extent of the powers given to clinicians to enforce treatment 96 : his conclusions were that capacity should play a role and that there should be no power to enforce treatment outside a clinical setting 97 . As to what was features were required for a successful CTO regime, he suggested that they were powers to control residence, to compel accepting visits from relevant professionals, a duty on the patient to attend out-patient appointments and to accept treatment, though with the proviso as to its enforcement without consent only in a clinical comprehensive review of studies into the efficacy of CTOs -"International Experiences of Using Community Treatment Orders" 107 , prepared by a team based at the Institute of Psychiatry at the Maudsley Hospital in South London 108 -suggests that CTOs originally had a different aim, namely assisting the transition from the use of asylums to the provision of community care, which left a group (including "revolving door" patients) less able to cope and so in need of ongoing intervention. In this context, CTOs were viewed as providing a less restrictive alternative than in-patient treatment and so ethically desirable 109 . But the other conceptualisation which is said to have become more prominent is that CTOs provide health benefits to the patient, usually with a view to preventing a relapse.
In assessing the efficacy of this aim, the Institute of Psychiatry report paints a picture which is less positive than Dawson's conclusions as to the benefits enjoyed. The researchers -"supported by a Department of Health Grant" 110 -reviewed the 72 research studies which had been carried out into civil CTO regimes in use in various parts of the world 111 . The report notes that there are different forms of CTO, but with three recurring themes, namely (1) whether the criteria are the same as for a hospital treatment order, (2) whether the aim is to treat or to prevent a deterioration, and (3) whether the aim is to provide patient choice for a less restrictive regime than in-patient treatment or to be a tool for involuntary management of patients (such as revolving door patients) 112 . The different aims might well overlap, but the report suggested that it was important to be clear about the reason for the regime because that had implications for how it was to be designed and used in practice, with those based on the least restrictive option having conceptual problems and being difficult to use in practice, whereas those based on preventive aims raise the potential for human rights challenges 113 . However, the different aims did not affect the likely recipients of a CTO, typically people with a long history of schizophrenia-like or serious affective illness 114 . The proposals in what was then the Mental Health Bill 2006 were considered as aiming to prevent deterioration whilst allowing treatment in the least restrictive environment 115 .
As for efficacy, the summary of the report 116 noted: Speaking in favour of restricting the criteria for CTOs at the Report stage in the House of Commons 117 , Tim Loughton MP 118 made the major speech for those opposed to the government's position. He noted "There is no empirical evidence for the efficacy of CTOs where they exist overseas… The Government have been proceeding with a new measure, pioneering new ground affecting new classes of patients, without being able to provide evidence that this arrangement works anywhere in the world where there is an equivalent system" 119 . Turning to the potential for damaging effects, he expressed concern that resource provision for voluntary patients would be lost because of the concentration on CTOs; and he both quoted an expert view as to the risks of increased avoidance of treatment and the continuation of the unequal treatment of people from ethnic minorities, and also noted that there was no proper information as to why the existing powers under ss17 and 25Aff were not working, which should be provided before a new regime was put in place. Despite this, the opposition supported the introduction of the CTO, merely suggesting that the concerns outlined justified a regime with restricted criteria. The proposals from the government were said to be too open-ended and so would cover too many people 120 , particularly in light of tendencies to make use of powers if only to avoid criticism in the event of any problems. The suggestions put forward as to the restrictions to be imposed on the regime 121 were not accepted by the Commons.
In light of the fact that the regime as introduced in the Mental Health Act 2007 is in terms of the legal powers different in form rather than substance, and in the context of the switch to community care which has proceeded whether or not something labelled a CTO was on the statute books, the question arises as to whether the CTO debate was worth the fuss.
D. Resources
On one level, the debate during the Westminster proceedings about the structure of community treatment for England and Wales was a complete red herring, given that no new powers were created, rather that existing powers were shifted around. The power that remains absent is one to compel medication in the community: it was never on the This was also a concern picked up by Dawson: for example, he records the experience of Victoria in the 1990s where there had been the growth in CTO use but without adequate resources, leading to criticisms from coroners in Melbourne investigating suicides by patients on CTOs. More resources were then found 124 . He added:
"No one spoken to believed the introduction of CTOs was a successful way to save public money, because, to work effectively, the regime must be backed by well-resourced systems of community mental health care."
Given the target group, and the sensible aim of preventing the cycle of relapse into serious illnesspreventive medicine having a role to play in mental health practice as much as in general practice -it is obvious that resources are the key. The new powers in the 2007 Act cannot alter the fact that there are patients who present difficulties because of features such as lack of insight or the presence of other problems, often drug and alcohol misuse, which make compliance with treatment a low priority for them. The new CTO regime requires their agreement to the conditions and their co-operation in practice: but if patients are to be nominated for the use of CTOs on account of shared features such as lack of engagement or lack of insight into the need to co-operate, a regime which depends on patient co-operation is unlikely to succeed. Rather, there has to be monitoring and persuasion, and that can only happen if there are people to carry out the monitoring and persuading. Dawson makes this point 125 : the use of CTOs seems most likely to produce positive outcomes when there is a regime which is wellembedded and supported by clinicians, with reasonably intensive resources provided by clinicians who visit patients, but also additional services such as accommodation and alcohol and drug services, plus co-ordination with in-patient services, and continuity of staff who are experienced and assertive. Every point he makes rests on matters of resources or the organisation of services, not on whether the regime is called a CTO. 123 Churchill Report, p191. 124 Dawson p32. 125 Page 5. But since the absence of any true choice reflects the reality for patients who do not accept their illness or do not fully co-operate and relapse 127 , could it be said that it introduces greater transparency into the process, as Dawson suggested in relation to its use in New Zealand in place of leave 128 and should be welcomed as such? If a CTO is used in place of leave beyond 7 days (and so in relation to a patient whose present condition justifies liability to in-patient treatment), it really makes no difference whether the patient is liable to be detained or liable to be recalled to detention: the effect is the same, and it would be more honest to stay with the current regime and record the patient as being liable to detention. If the CTO is used in relation to patients currently under the aftercare under supervision regime, and so subject to monitoring and assessment as to whether they should be detained in the event of relapse, changing their status as liable to recall to detention is also less honest because of the perception that might be created that their co-operation is now conditioned by a power to swiftly detain them for breach of the conditions of the CTO, whereas the truth is that it will still depend on their mental condition justifying detention.
So it will come down to how the regime is operated in practice. The legal framework is much less important than resources and good practice: which makes it a real shame that the government made use of smoke and mirrors to create the impression of a problem which was not clearly reflected in the research it relied on and a new solution which merely repackaged what was already there.
